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Romanticising the Past: 
Core Socialist Values 




This article examines “core socialist values” as a part of the China Dream discourse, in 
the context of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s search for alternative sources of 
legitimacy. Using the “visualising our values” poster collection and the “China Dream 
Child” campaign as case studies, this article argues that such narratives form a crucial 
part of the CCP’s continuing legitimisation strategy, where the party emphasises its role 
in providing moral authority and guidance for the general public. In order to lay such 
claims, the narratives focus on romanticising and homogenising both the imperial and 
the socialist past, while projecting a strong sense of optimism for the future, based on 
similar hopes of continuity and homogeneity.
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Introduction
China’s propaganda system is one of the most successful and pervasive in the world. 
A key rationale behind the developing trajectory of Chinese propaganda after 1949 
has been to establish and maintain the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s legitimacy. 
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Mao Zedong’s various political movements and slogans were to establish and retain 
the CCP’s status as the revolutionary party, and it was the inability of the party to 
transition from a revolutionary party to a party in power that led to the legitimacy 
crisis of 1989 (Brady, 2012). Afterwards, the CCP renewed its emphasis on “thought 
work” (思想工作, sixiang gongzuo) using Western methodologies and new technolo-
gies. Contrary to those who argue that market reform and capitalist forces have 
undermined the CCP’s propaganda efforts (Lynch, 1999; Zhao, 1998), the party’s 
ability to broadcast its political message en masse has remained strong. From 2002 
onwards, the CCP’s status as party in power has been written into the Constitution, 
signalling the top leader’s awareness that the party’s legitimacy now partly depended 
on public support.
From 2013 onwards, China’s propaganda machines embraced President Xi Jinping’s 
“China Dream” (中国梦, zhongguo meng) as a new buzzword and overarching para-
digm. Since then, scholarly work has proliferated on what the China Dream means, what 
it entails, and its implications for China’s domestic development and international rela-
tions. Most articles, thus far, have focused on the policy outcomes of the China Dream, 
what it means for China’s soft power overseas, and what exactly it is that the CCP hopes 
to achieve in terms of its national development (Callahan, 2015; Feng, 2015; Li, 2015a). 
Less attention, however, is paid to the propaganda campaigns that are disseminated at 
the ground level and that permeate Chinese citizens’ everyday life. Attention to such 
widespread and thematic campaigns is important because the China Dream discourse 
evokes not only the imagined perfect nation but also the good life, a “composite ideol-
ogy” that encompasses dreams of national revival with individual fulfilment and happi-
ness (Callahan, 2017). Regardless of the factuality in these narratives, they represent a 
nation’s imagined future as prescribed by the ruling class and illustrate the perfect soci-
ety and citizenry (i.e. one that is most conducive to regime sustainability) as imagined by 
the CCP leadership.
This article thus examines “core socialist values” (社会主义核心价值观, shehui 
zhuyi hexin jiazhiguan; hereafter “CSVs”), one of the most fundamental and perva-
sive propaganda campaigns within the China Dream discourse. An overview on 
Chinese propaganda and recent changes is given, followed by a closer look at the 
“visualising our values” poster collection, which shows how CSVs is popularised at 
the ground level, which differs from its official maxims. Then the article will present 
a case study of the “China Dream Child” (中国梦娃, zhongguo mengwa) campaign, 
analysing the key values presented in turn. By using these two case studies, this arti-
cle shows that everyday CSVs campaigns selectively promote so- called traditional 
values that do not appear in the official twelve maxims but nevertheless contribute to 
the overall legitimisation strategy. The actual campaign on the ground thus offers a 
unique insight into how the CCP both romanticises and homogenises the imperial and 
socialist past, in order to construct a moral narrative around the CSVs discourse, 
allowing the party to emphasise its role in providing moral authority and guidance for 
the general public.
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Background: Chinese Propaganda and the Continuing  
Search for Legitimacy
The CCP is acutely aware of the challenge of renewing legitimacy, publicly declaring in 2004 
that “[t]he party’s governing status is not congenital, nor is it something settled once and for 
all” (CCP Central Committee, 2004). In recent years, the scholarly consensus is that the main 
sources of regime legitimacy in contemporary China are a mixture of performance legitimacy 
– based on economic growth and sociopolitical stability – and nationalism (Pan, 2008; Zhu, 
2011). However, performance- based legitimacy can both be subjective and fleeting. How 
socio- economic stability translates to legitimacy is largely dependent on how the regime 
frames its performance narrative (Holbig and Gilley, 2010). Economic uncertainty almost 
always results in political challenges: the legitimacy crisis of 1989 prompted the CCP to 
renew its propaganda efforts, turning to nationalism and patriotism as the cornerstone of its 
legitimising strategy. As China’s economy grew rapidly, however, a separate set of challenges 
arose: an economically mature society often demands a greater degree of political participa-
tion and liberalism (Lipset, 1959). Nationalism, too, is a double- edged sword; left unchecked, 
it can result in violence, as the country witnessed in the 2012 anti- Japanese riots, as well as 
foster trenchant criticisms against those in the ruling party who are seen as corrupt and betray-
ing the national interest (Holbig and Gilley, 2010). The quest for the renewal of legitimacy 
while maintaining stable economic growth and political control thus poses a more complex 
challenge still. Indeed, in the last decade, Chinese academia and leadership have been con-
cerned about the threat of socio- economic inequality, corruption, and incapability of bureau-
cratic systems to regime legitimacy, and, as a result, many have proposed, along with 
improving social justice and governance, the use of propaganda and ideological guidance to 
create more participatory citizens as a legitimisation strategy (Zhang, 2014). While legitimis-
ation strategies are usually discussed in the context of discourse analysis, often for political 
speeches, the underlying process for legitimisation nevertheless relies on the argumentation 
and justification of social practices, usually through invoking public emotions about a hypo-
thetical future, in order to gain political approval (Reyes, 2011). In the absence of revolution-
ary and charismatic leadership, the Chinese state has to appeal to a grander narrative in order 
to secure its long- term legitimacy: a moral claim to Chinese culture, civilisation, and 
traditions.
Sinologists have long since acknowledged and problematised the idea of China being 
a “civilisation- state,” using the concept to explain the longevity of the unitary Chinese 
state (Dynon, 2014; Pye, 1990). Critically, as set out by Tu (1991), a civilisation- state 
exercises both political power and moral influence, where the political leadership 
assumes ideological and moral authority and exemplifies the civilisational norms for the 
general public. While “tradition” was denounced during the Mao era for its connotation 
with the imperial oppressive past, the idea of traditional culture and civilisation entered 
leadership discourses again in Deng Xiaoping’s era, when a distinction was made 
between material and spiritual civilisation (物质文明, wuzhi wenming vs. 精神文明, 
jingshen wenming; Deng, 1984). Under Jiang Zemin, “traditional values” began to be 
included in modern thought work, and “spiritual civilisation” became the cornerstone of 
the CCP propaganda as a form of depoliticised cultural nationalist rhetoric (Dynon, 
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2014). From 2001 onwards, key Confucian concepts have been included in the move-
ment for the “construction of moral education for Chinese citizens” (Brady, 2012). There 
is also a subtle shift in cultural topography as shown by the increased official presence 
and subsidies for Confucianism- related events as well as the incorporation of traditional 
Chinese holidays as national holidays (Cheung, 2012). This policy direction has reached 
new heights under the China Dream and CSVs campaign; attempts are even made to 
demonstrate the compatibility of these values with the mythical culture of the Yan 
Emperor, suggesting and further legitimising the Chineseness of this discourse (Mi, 
2016). This change in policy is less a change in philosophical belief than a return to 
patterns of social control in which Confucianism, along with ideas such as Mohism and 
Legalism, was dominant in Chinese society (Bakken, 2000). Moreover, it is also the 
result of the CCP’s anxiety to establish modern China’s political identity – in other 
words, to establish socialism with Chinese characteristics.
Ever since the CCP’s relationship with the Soviet Union became tense in the 1960s 
over questions of international communist leadership, the party has been adamant in 
finding its own revolutionary path to forge socialism with Chinese characteristics. 
During the Mao era, this meant that the party discourse was dominated by Marxist–
Leninist–Maoist revolutionary rhetoric, which not only separated Communist China 
ideologically from the West but also put a tense distance between that and the “Soviet 
big brother.” Since the reform era, however, the CCP has gradually moved away from 
such revolutionary discourses and, after a few fits and starts, looked to “traditional 
Chinese values” as a replacement paradigm that underlines socialism with “Chinese 
characteristics.” The CCP has now sought to distance itself ideologically from the West 
by arguing that the China Dream, based on cultural heritage, is different from the 
American Dream, or the American liberal hegemony.
Indeed, the CCP has been wary of so- called Western influence since its founding. 
Despite the gradual introduction of capitalist elements and market economy since the 
1980s, the CCP has rejected “peaceful evolution” and the idea of Western modernity. 
Instead, the CCP has always pursued an alternate modernity, a “socialist modernity,” 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics,” a “China model,” or different variations 
thereof. In this vision, capitalism presupposed socialism: henceforth, China was not 
capitalist, but rather in the primary stages of socialism. Since Xi Jinping came to 
power in 2013, this propaganda strategy has been expanded and given renewed 
emphasis under the so- called CSVs, as a part of the grander China Dream discourse. 
Some of these values have been given detailed consideration in previous research 
(Feng, 2015), and it has since been argued that the CSVs campaign is a shift in pro-
paganda focus with an overarching attempt to emphasise the sociopolitical super-
structure over the economic base, in order to build civic consensus (Gow, 2017). 
Indeed, unlike their predecessors in the state–socialist era, these campaigns do not 
attempt to mobilise viewers into action at all, and instead focus on creating an “ide-
alised, harmonious and caring past” (Landsberger, 2019), in order to allow the party 




This article uses the “visualising our values” poster collection and the “China Dream 
Child” animated advertisement (ad) as the two selected case studies for understanding 
how CSVs is being disseminated on the ground, and the kind of grand narratives the 
campaign seeks to propagate. All 388 posters in the “visualising our values” collection, 
starting from 2014, were downloaded from the official depository for all propaganda 
materials in the CSVs campaign, run by the Ministry of Propaganda (Wenming, 2014). 
The “China Dream Child” televised ad, one of the most widely broadcasted propaganda 
commercials in China, was published by China Central Television (CCTV) in 2015 and 
is available to view online at YouTube (2015). Both campaigns are still active in China 
as of 2020. Supplemental propaganda materials, such as essays and editorials, constitut-
ing as “thought work pieces” (思想工作论述, sixiang gongzuo lunshu), published in 
state and local CCP outlets covering the key themes in CSVs and the China Dream Child 
ads were collected systematically using keywords in their internal search engines, and 
used to illustrate how key messages in these campaigns are explained and legitimised in 
mainstream media. These two campaigns were specifically selected because they are the 
main campaign drives behind CSVs, and they cover the two types of media most com-
monly found in propaganda: posters and video advertisements. The former has lined 
Chinese streets and billboards from 2013 to present, across public spaces in both urban 
and rural China, while the latter appears frequently across all CCTV platforms in vary-
ing lengths – from short few- second bursts to minute- long segments; it fills up the breaks 
between all kinds of CCTV programmes. Their audience reach is far and wide: citizens 
are now ubiquitously exposed to these materials across Chinese public spaces (Zhao, 
2019).
Core Socialist Values in Rhetoric and Dissemination:  
The “Visualising Our Values” Poster Collection
The idea of “CSVs,” or core value system of socialism,” was first in the Sixth Plenary 
Session of the 16th CCP Central Committee in 2006. The overarching themes and ideas 
were a clear continuation from the previous state- building projects and propaganda ven-
tures: the title of the document references Hu’s Harmonious Society concept, and the 
ideas contained in the CSVs framework are built upon The Programme for Improving 
Civic Morality (issued in 2001), which advocated “patriotism and observance of the law; 
courtesy and honesty; solidarity and friendship; diligence, frugality and self- 
improvement; and devotion and contribution [to society]” (Ping et al., 2004). The 18th 
Party Congress in 2012 then reiterated the importance of building CSVs, and defined it 
as:
[T]he soul of the Chinese nation which will serve as the guide for building socialism with 
Chinese characteristics. We should carry out a thorough study of and education in these val-
ues and use them to guide social trends of thought and forge public consensus. (Hu, 2012)
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According to the party journal Qiushi, the focal point of this task is twofold: first, it has 
to promote socialism with Chinese characteristics, and second, it has to be implemented 
through effective means of Western- style propaganda. The so- called socialist values, 
being superior to that of their Capitalist counterparts, should be “built upon the successes 
of human civilisation, including those introduced by capitalism,” so that it might show-
case the openness and advancement of socialist Chinese civilisation (Qiushi Editorial, 
2012). In order to do that, “Western, especially American”-style propaganda should be 
employed. The CSVs project, therefore, is an attempt to modernise and popularise pro-
paganda in an era where standardised, politicised, and detached- from- life slogans have 
fallen out of popularity. In implementation, it should not be “anything new”; instead, it 
should utilise existing terminology and slogans with which the public is already familiar. 
It should offer flexibility in interpretation and presentation, while maintaining some lev-
els of standardisation (Qiushi Editorial, 2012). The end result is the twelve maxims 
(twenty- four characters) that have been seen all over on Chinese streets since 2013 
(Table 1).
Heralded as the “common denominator for the values of socialism,” these twelve 
values are interlinked and laid out on three different dimensions: state, society, and per-
sonal (Qiushi Editorial, 2012). At the top, prosperity, democracy, civility and harmony 
are “national objectives,” and are seen as taking leading roles in all other values. The 
middle level presents freedom, equality, justice and the rule of law, which is “a vivid 
expression of a good society,” the “basic feature of socialism with Chinese characteris-
tics,” and a “long term goal and practice of the CCP.” At the personal level, patriotism, 
dedication, integrity and friendliness are seen as the “moral guideline of all people, a 
fundamental code of ethics used to evaluate the moral standards of citizens.” Together, 
Table 1. Core Socialist Values.
Level Values




Society level Freedom 自由, ziyou
Equality 平等, pingdeng
Justice 公正, gongzheng
Rule of Law 法治, fazhi





this presents a neat framework in which morally commendable citizens live in a good 
society with rights and freedoms guaranteed by the hard work of the CCP, which would 
lead to the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” as a national objective (Qiushi Editorial, 
2012).
On 22 May 2013, the Research Centre for Theories of Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics (RCTSCC) under the Ministry of Education published a detailed piece in 
the People’s Daily, outlining each of the twelve CSVs and their definitions. The RCTSCC 
is directly under the supervision of the Ministry of Propaganda and the Ministry of 
Education Party Group. It is primarily responsible for the dissemination of party values 
in higher education and serves “to promote Sinicised Marxism through the popularisa-
tion of theories” (Wu, 2013). In this particular article, which is widely quoted as the most 
authoritative interpretation of CSVs, many key concepts are redefined and reinterpreted. 
These definitions are then incorporated into official propaganda websites and party study 
materials, and often serve as a starting point for further propaganda work at the local 
level.
It is easy to dismiss these concepts as lip service if we only consider it in the context 
of conventional or Western usage. There is, however, an underlying consistency to the 
narrative, which helps the CCP to juxtapose and reconcile otherwise contradictory con-
cepts, so that they can be integrated into the grander discourse of the China Dream, and 
socialism with Chinese characteristics. For instance, a distinction is made between “nor-
mative values” such as prosperity, civility, and justice, and “aspirational values” such as 
democracy and harmony, with the former indicating values that are pre- existing “natural 
states” under socialism, while the latter represents values that are not a given but have to 
be attained through hard work. Some of the CSVs terms have specific interpretations 
different to the conventional definitions: democracy, for example, is defined as “people’s 
democracy” or “consultative democracy,” as opposed to Western- style democracy, 
which was proclaimed a dead end for China by Hu Jintao in 2004 (Cabestan, 2004). 
Freedom is specified as free will, the freedom to live and the freedom of development, 
but not freedom of movement, assembly, or association (Wu, 2013), as these are discre-
tionary to party policy and not guaranteed, even in rhetoric. The concept of harmony, 
which is most often associated with internet censorship in China, is in fact suggested as 
a response to the increasing socio- economic inequality resulting from market transition 
that emphasised “cooperation across all strata of society” in order to achieve the “mutual 
goal” of a prosperous society, defined as “the achievement of equal access to social ser-
vices and rights such as healthcare, education, employment, elderly care and housing” 
(Wu, 2013).
Not only are most of the values given party- ordained definitions, but some of these 
definitions are deliberately vague, in order to create wide- reaching, all- encompassing, 
and ambiguous catch- all terms that allow the CCP to legitimise certain social behaviours 
while denouncing others. Civility, for example, is constructed as a “summary of national, 
scientific and popular socialism,” a symbol for “progressive society,” which is “outward 
looking, future- oriented and modernising,” and should serve as an “important pillar for 
the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Wu, 2013). By far, the most widely utilised 
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concept in propaganda, this ambiguous interpretation allows the CCP to deploy the con-
cept of civility as a soft form of social control using a variety of ideas sourced from 
Confucianism to the May Fourth movement, past and present (Brady, 2012). Similarly, 
personal- level maxims such as integrity and friendliness are given broad definitions like 
“the integral foundation of all social relationships” (Wu, 2013), drawing upon so- called 
traditional values and emphasising the role of the party- state in revitalising such values. 
In doing so, individual and social behaviours are subsumed in the wider discourse of 
national rejuvenation and growth, as it paints the image of everyone working towards the 
same goal.
The official policy documents aiming to define and interpret the CSVs framework are 
dry and notoriously abstract. In order to widely disseminate these ideas and raise public 
awareness, they had to be popularised. One of the key propaganda efforts to disseminate 
CSVs is the poster collection of “visualising our values,” now widely seen on Chinese 
streets since 2013. Available centrally online for provincial and local use, this propa-
ganda campaign collection has 388 posters in total (Wenming, 2014). Some of the key 
messages are repeated several times, using different illustrative forms. After extracting 
all the keywords from these posters, Figure 1 shows the key themes outlined in them and 
their frequency of appearance.
All twelve CSVs appear in the margins of each poster, and a total of eleven posters 
are devoted to the artistic rendering of these values verbatim. A total of sixty- eight post-
ers, 17.5 per cent of the total collection, depicts individual case stories of outstanding 
members of the CCP, taking on the role of individual moral exemplars. The rest typically 
has a thematic focus or highlights one or few specific value sets.
We can see that not all values are given equal representation in the poster dissemina-
tion, which suggests the state is prioritising certain values over others. Out of the twelve 
maxims shown in Table 1, only six are directly referenced in the posters (compare 
Figure 1): prosperity, civility, and harmony as national- level values, and patriotism, 
friendliness, and integrity as personal- level values. All of the four societal level values – 
freedom, equality, justice, and rule of law – are absent from the poster collection along 
with the value of democracy and dedication. As mentioned before, these missing six 
values under the CSV framework have very specific interpretations and definitions, all 
of which fall under the strict guideline of the party- state. As individuals are not expected 
to interpret or contribute towards these values, but instead are considered the beneficia-
ries in a society where these values will be allowed to prosper, values such as democracy 
and rule of law are not popularised in the poster collection. Out of the six core values 
portrayed, patriotic themes are by far the most heavily featured, which is unsurprising 
given how nationalism is an integral part of the CCP’s legitimacy and governing strategy 
(Gries, 2004; Zhao, 1998). Patriotic posters often contain messages reminding the public 
of the CCP’s role in China’s national rejuvenation and emphasise the importance of 
individuals submitting themselves to the collective task of achieving the China Dream 
(Figure 2).
What is more notable is that a significant proportion of the posters features thematic 
messages that are not part of the official CSV framework but instead utilise ideas that are 
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broadly categorised and portrayed as “traditional values,” including benevolence, virtue, 
filial piety, blessing, and family (usually referred to as Confucian traditions in supple-
mentary propaganda materials), and diligence and frugality (described as CCP traditions 
in supplementary propaganda materials). Apart from patriotism, these are the most fre-
quently mentioned values in the poster collection, which suggests these are the priori-
tised messages that the campaign wants to advocate to its audience. Together, they 
illustrate how citizens should behave under the guiding framework of CSV, and, more 
Figure 1. Occurrence of Keyword Values in the “Visualising Our Values” Poster Collection.
Note: Occurrence of values in the posters do not add up to 388 since posters can portray more than one 
value at the time. CCP: Chinese Communist Party; CSV: core socialist values.
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importantly, they help to define the relationship between citizens’ personal behaviour 
and the national objective. In doing so, the campaign employs a mixture of ideas from 
Confucian classics to socialist revolutionary exemplars, while maintaining a progressive 
outlook that heralds the CCP as both the liberator of China and the leader of the Chinese 
Dream. This is best illustrated by the concurrent “China Dream Child” campaign being 
deployed alongside the posters.
The China Dream Child Campaign
The China Dream Child is one of the most popular and widespread advertisement col-
lections in the CSVs campaign. China Dream Child, a clay figurine girl, is the central 
feature of this short animated film commissioned by the Ministry of Propaganda aiming 
to popularise CSVs. The film animated seven thematic values (family- nation, diligence, 
filial piety, friendliness, frugality, integrity, and harmony), presented as seven easy- to- 
rhyme maxims, which were further disseminated in the form of posters, slogans, and 
billboards (Figure 3).
Of the seven values popularised by the China Dream Child campaign, only three are 
direct adaptations of official CSVs maxims: friendliness, integrity, and harmony, though 
the value of “family- nation” alludes to patriotic themes. The others, like those found in 
the “visualising our values” poster collection, represent “traditional values” from both 
Confucian and revolutionary heritage, and the two are often deployed side by side. The 
China Dream Child collection is an excellent example of how CSVs campaigns are 
Figure 2. Core Socialist Values (CSVs) Posters with the Slogans (a) “The Beauty of Our 
Native Land is Due to the Redness of Our Party Flag” and (b) “Many Horses Galloping 
[Towards] the China Dream.”
Source: Wenming (2014).
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actually conducted on the ground: values such as democracy and rule of law are over-
looked, while “traditional” values branded as personal virtues such as filial piety and 
frugality are celebrated. Further propaganda literature, often written by Chinese scholars 
and cadres, were published in newspapers, magazines and websites, focusing on each 
proclaimed value, offering official definitions and interpretations of the maxims, and 
advocating moral reasoning as to why these values should be desired. This section will 
analyse these seven values thematically along with the accompanying propaganda liter-
ature on these values to illustrate how the central feature of the on- the- ground CSVs 
propaganda campaign is that they present a homogenised and romanticised idea of 
China’s past, and seek to establish a hegemonic discourse of how to build China’s future.
Symbolism of the Family-Nation
The first maxim to the China Dream Child film employs the notion of a “family- 
nation,” with the accompanying animation depicting a bird nest containing many 
eggs in a large tree with the slogan “a nation is made of many families, there can be 
no family without a nation” (国是千万家, 有国才有家, guoshi qianwanjia, youguo 
caiyoujia). The implication is that if the nation (tree) falls, families (bird nest) and 
individuals (eggs) would also fall and shatter. The posters deployed alongside the ad 
depict a closed iron gate, with the underlying message that if the gate to a nation is 
Figure 3. A China Dream Child Poster.
Note: The seven central maxims are: nation is family (国是家, guoshijia), diligence as foundation (勤为本, 
qinweiben), filial piety first (孝当先, xiaodangxian), friendliness as soul (善作魂, shanzuohun), frugality as 
virtue (俭养德, jianyangde), integrity as self- conduct (诚立身, chenglishen), and harmony is precious (和为
贵, heweigui). 
Source: Wenming (2014).
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breached, the gates of each family will not be safe either. In other propaganda uses, 
the phrase “nation as family” is used synonymously with “family- nation sentiment” 
(家国情怀, jiaguo qinghuai), which the official interpretation calls a “unique Chinese 
value” and traces it back to the Confucian Book of Rites and to Mencius (China Youth 
Daily, 2014). There is also a special emphasis on how the communist revolution mod-
ernised this traditional virtue: in a widely reposted piece, the China Youth Daily 
argued that even though the idea of treating nation as your family existed long ago:
In imperial times the nation belonged to the emperor, and was in no way a concern of the 
people. Even though there were tales of emperors enjoying life as commoners, these were 
nothing but window- dressing for oppressive regimes […] It is only after the establishment 
of the PRC [People’s Republic of China] that people became the masters of their own coun-
try and could enjoy peace both in their families and their country. (China Youth Daily, 2014)
The act of modernising traditional values are what Bakken (2000) calls “repetition with 
a difference” – where memories of the past are utilised to control the modern. What is 
particularly of note here is that the CSVs framework describes the Communist liberation 
not only as a political and historical event but also a triumph for the personal and moral 
development of all Chinese citizens; it is only when the people are no longer oppressed 
and constrained by the imperial rule can they fully realise the “traditional” and the “vir-
tuous” values accumulated by China’s thousands of years of history. Consequently, the 
CCP now depicts itself as the inheritor and promoter of the purified “essence of tradi-
tional culture,” which is crucial for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
Furthermore, the key ingredient to the notion of “family- nation” lies in its ability to 
transcend ethnic and geographical differences when evoking themes of nationalism, 
which can be utilised in events of political significance such as the Hong Kong handover 
to bolster the legitimacy of the CCP (Pan et al., 2001). In doing so, the idea of family- 
nation places a heavy emphasis on the individual as the foundation of social stability and 
national prosperity. The CCP News website editorial notes that CSVs recall the Confucian 
ideals of self- betterment (修身治平, xiushen zhiping) – the idea that an individual must 
first self- cultivate before he or she can manage his or her family, govern a country, and 
finally unify and bring peace to the world (Hua, 2014). The idea of self- betterment is 
further expanded to correspond with the call to have more “positive energy” in people’s 
lives, to focus positively on self- help rather than passively blaming others for the short-
comings of society. The People’s Daily editor, Lu (2012), gave a famous motivational 
speech at Peking University’s graduation ceremony in 2012:
No matter how China is, please remember: China is where you stand. The way you are 
represents how China is. What kind of person you are, makes China the kind of country it 
is. If you turn towards the light, China will not be dark.
This speech was picked up by mainstream media and widely disseminated in support of 
the family- nation campaign. Subsequently, there were many spin- offs of “positive 
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thinking” phrases that emphasised how individuals should change their attitude and take 
responsibility for themselves when faced with external crises. When Chengdu was hit by 
heavy smog in December 2016, a screenshot of a WeChat log went viral on the internet, 
in which a local high school issued a ban on masks for their students, with the comment 
that “as long as you have sunshine in your hearts, smog will eventually dissipate” (Hu 
and Shi, 2016). The authenticity of the comment was contested and the authority’s 
attempts to verify the claim fell flat after the headlines passed, but it shows the impact of 
these motivational campaigns and how these ideas reframe public and political issues 
into a personal one.
Renewed Emphasis on Filial Piety as Form of Social Control
Another maxim in the China Dream Child rhyme that receives significant airtime is the 
emphasis that “filial piety should come first.” Although filial piety is not officially a part 
of the twelve CSVs maxims, it features heavily in on- the- ground deployment of propa-
ganda under the CSVs umbrella campaign. Usually, this is done through depictions of 
relatable images such as domestic scenes and folklore: in the China Dream Child video, 
filial piety is accompanied by images of a man washing his father’s feet, when his son 
also joins and offers a towel to his back. The video urges with the message that “filial 
piety should be passed down in generations” (Figure 4). The use of these “traditional” 
Figure 4. Screenshot from the China Dream Child Ad Collection, with the Slogan “Filial Piety 
First.”
Source: YouTube (2015).
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and “age- old” motifs emphasise the idea that filial piety is not new, but rather a virtue 
that should be reawakened among the Chinese public.
The CCP’s recent attempt to promote filial piety in national political discourse can be 
seen as having several end goals. First, values that encourage duty and submission such 
as filial piety are conducive to sociopolitical stability. Filial piety is seen as “an individ-
ual’s contribution towards building a harmonious society, and is the cornerstone upon 
which every other virtue can be built” (Wang, 2014). These so- called traditional virtues 
act as a panacea to China’s growth pains of reform and modernisation, and, without 
them, China would encounter a moral crisis: “as social structure and economic life diver-
sifies,” writes one thought work piece,
many of the [19]80’s and [19]90’s generations have been accustomed to the “little emperor” 
or “little princess” lifestyle, and have become selfish, fragile and ungrateful […] it is only 
by learning filial piety that they will learn to respect and appreciate life, and will not harm 
themselves or others. (Li, 2015b)
Similar drastic consequences of individual moral decay as a result of a lack of filial piety 
that lead to social unrest is a common theme among such thought work pieces. As 
Callahan (2017) notes, such moral crises are an umbrella discourse introduced by the 
ruling party in response to society’s socioeconomic and political crises.
Second, respectful children and a tightly knit family are seen as answers to China’s 
ageing society. One author admits that although the state is beginning to roll out basic 
pension cover to rural areas, at CNY 55 per month per person, it is far from sufficient; 
hence, elderly care in rural areas still need to rely on the old method of “raising children 
to provide for old age,” whereby filial piety subordinates the younger generation to the 
older as a way to guarantee the former material support in old age. Without filial chil-
dren, the article warns, the suicide rate among the elderly will increase, families will 
crumble, and social harmony will be threatened as a result (Li, 2015b). In 2013, the 
revised Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly included a new 
section stipulating that those who live apart from their parents should visit or greet the 
elderly regularly, although punishment for failing to do so was not specified (Zhang, 
2017). Thus, reviving filial piety is also an attempt to ameliorate the lack of complete 
state welfare for the elderly in the post- market transition era.
The re- emergence of filial piety as a part of national political discourse is a post- 
reform phenomenon. Under state socialism, the ideological discourse and radical socio- 
economic restructuring called for the reshaping of family units to larger socialist 
collectives, albeit the drive was ultimately unsuccessful (Whyte, 2005). During the 
reform era, the CCP became more pragmatic about the importance of family relation-
ships in terms of the support for the elderly: Article 45 of the 1982 Constitution stated 
that the elderly have “the right to material assistance from and be supported by their sons 
in their old age” as well as the “right to material assistance from the state and society” 
(People’s Republic of China Constitution, 1982). The terminology used by the State 
Council and Ministry of Civil Affairs at the time, however, still avoided keywords such 
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as filial piety, and instead used phrases such as “fostering the fine tradition of mutual 
assistance among relatives, friends and neighbours,” which is more in line with the col-
lectivist tendencies of the 1960s–1970s (Chow, 1991). Since the early twenty- first cen-
tury, the re- emergence of filial piety in public discourse is seen as a part of China’s 
search for modernity and soft power (Zhang, 2013), and contrast is often explicitly 
drawn between the kind of filial piety that is the “drivel of imperial, feudal times,” and 
the right kind that is the “essence of traditional Chinese culture,” which is argued to be 
fully compatible with CSVs (Wang, 2014).
Third, as the CCP is the head of China’s paternalistic state, the emphasis on filial piety 
is used to further strengthen its legitimacy claims, as the relationship between the parent 
and the children can be emulated by the relationship between the ruler and the people 
(Wang, 1980). Again, this ties in with the idea of family- nation, in which “a family is the 
smallest country and a country is made up of thousands of families” (Zhang, 2014). 
Patriotism is therefore described as filial loyalty to the state. Duan (2015) wrote that:
from a [society’s] developmental point of view, being loyal to your country and your place 
of work, so that your parents and your superiors do not have to worry about your perfor-
mance in work, is also a type of filial piety […] loyalty and patriotism is filial piety at its 
most transcendent.
Finally, the emphasis on filial piety as a traditional Chinese value is juxtaposed against 
the CCP’s wariness of Western universal values and Western cultural hegemony. The 
Ministry of Civil Affairs warned as early as in 1987 that “the situation in which the better 
the social security develops, the weaker the family role becomes as in the West must be 
avoided” (Chow, 1991). Filial piety continues to be heralded as a “defining feature of the 
Chinese nation,” a value that “sets us apart from western cultures” (Wang, 2014). Not 
only does this claim promote national identity but it also implies that the Western (liberal 
democratic) development trajectory will inevitably lead to social crisis; thus, China must 
forge its own path by seeking answers from its “long and glorious history.”
From Interpersonal to Sociopolitical: Harmony and Friendliness
The two maxims on friendliness and harmony often appear together on TV, in posters, 
and the accompanying materials. In the China Dream Child ad, the motif for harmony is 
a traditional Chinese painting of lotus and fish, depicting harmonious co- existence, 
whereas the accompanying CSVs poster uses ecological harmony as a motif for socio-
political harmony (Figure 5).
The vagueness of these messages compared to the others shows the extent to which 
harmony is used as a catch- all umbrella term in the overall narrative. Harmony has been 
a main propaganda focus for the CCP since the introduction of “harmonious society” as 
a political concept by the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee in 2004. 
The CCP leadership have since sought to redefine and reinterpret the concept as a 
melange of ideas drawn from thinkers such as Confucius, Mencius, Mozi, and even 
Taiping rebel leaders, ignoring the tension presented in these arguments (Delury, 2008). 
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In more recent years, CCP usage of harmony has expanded ever more and is now an 
underpinning feature of CCP’s development goal. According to the official interpreta-
tion, harmony is divided into three levels: social harmony (social stability), harmony 
among humans and the environment (sustainability), and harmony among countries 
(peace; Guo, 2014a).
While the visual representation of harmony is vaguely focused on general well- being 
and harmonious interpersonal relationships, the supplementary propaganda essays 
emphasise more on its sociopolitical function. According to a People’s Daily editorial, 
for instance, harmony is “the natural and defining characteristic for Chinese socialism 
[…] all other forms of socio- political organisation are fundamentally incapable of gen-
erating harmonious societies” (Liu, 2014). The continued emphasis on harmony appears 
to be both a rhetorical and policy response to mounting socio- economic inequalities in 
post- reform Chinese society. Indeed, the concept of harmony was initially suggested as 
a response to the increasing socio- economic inequality resulting from market transition, 
which emphasised “cooperation across all strata of society” in order to achieve the 
“mutual goal” of a prosperous society. Henceforth, harmony is perhaps the most striking 
example of hegemonic discourse, as it can mean different things to different sections of 
the population and under different contexts. Using the harmony discourse, individuals 
are encouraged by the state to seek non- conflicting ways of resolving disputes among 
themselves and against the authorities; internet and media censorship is legitimised as a 
necessary way to maintain social stability; environmental concerns such as air pollution 
and food safety are subsumed; and even China’s rise on the international stage can be 
placed in the framework to support its peaceful intentions (Guo, 2014b).
Figure 5. Screenshots from the China Dream Child Ad Collection, with the Slogans (a) 




In order to achieve such harmony and social stability, emphasis is placed on the need 
for friendliness (友善, youshan) in Chinese society, again by referencing the value’s 
traditional roots. An article published on Beijing Propaganda Office’s website directly 
equates friendship with benevolence (仁, ren), again tracing the philosophical roots of 
these terms back to Confucian classics (Guo, 2014a). As with the concepts above, once 
the validity, Chineseness, and moral desirability of the value are established, attempts 
are made to modernise and contextualise it so that it becomes relevant in today’s society. 
The China Dream Child ad shows friendliness in the most conventional sense, by depict-
ing a policeman helping a farmer with a broken- down vehicle, but the supplemental 
materials again put a theoretical spin on the phrase and argue for a more comprehensive, 
catch- all definition of the value, which can be applied to personal and political contexts. 
For instance, one report advocated that modern- day friendliness has four dimensions: 
from civil friendliness (公民友善, gongmin youshan) and behaviours such as helping 
others in day- to- day environments, to friendliness in society (社会友善, shehui youshan) 
which can act as a social adhesive, as “being friends often means working towards the 
same goal […] and the common goal of all Chinese people is the rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation” (Guo, 2014a: 11). The author then elevates the concept and argues that 
friendliness among countries (国际友善, guoji youshan) is necessary for maintaining 
international peace, and environmental friendliness (生态友善, shengtai youshan) pro-
motes sustainability (Guo, 2014a: 33). Thus, the value of friendliness is also promoted 
as a hegemonic discourse. It is seen as a panacea to the ill effects of market reform and 
the transition of Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft (community to society) as it eases the 
struggles between post- reform haves and have- nots, helps to ensure social stability (Li 
and Wang, 2015), saves the environment, and promotes collective identity and a sense of 
communal belonging (Huang, 2015).
Reclaiming Individual Virtues: Diligence, Frugality and Integrity
The use of moral exemplars has long been a notable feature of Chinese moral and public 
education (Bakken, 2000; Reed, 1995). The CSV campaign not only stresses ideational 
values that individuals should strive for, but they also repackage these values as “social-
ist traditional,” referring back to the CCP’s revolutionary and Maoist era. The remaining 
three values in the China Dream Child film are treated as the underlying foundations of 
a socialist moral exemplar: diligence, frugality, and integrity. The ad again employs tra-
ditional Chinese art styles to illustrate these values such as paper- cutting and traditional 
paintings. In the accompanying posters, these values are given almost hallowed proper-
ties; it is argued that those who follow the virtues of diligence and frugality will reap 
blessings, longevity, and happiness as rewards (Figure 6).
The accompanying propaganda essays for these values usually follow similar legiti-
mising techniques. First, they establish that these values have traditional, often 
Confucian, roots, hence inherently Chinese. Diligence is traced back to the Confucian 
classic Book of Documents (Han, 2013), frugality is quoted back to the sayings of the 
Tang Chancellor Wei Zheng and the Song Confucian thinker Zhang Zai, and integrity is 
highlighted to be one of the “Five Constants” in Confucianism. Then, these pieces 
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usually argue that these values have been consolidated and brought to the fore by moral 
exemplars from the revolutionary and socialist era. The value of frugality, for instance, 
highlights the CCP’s modest beginnings. An article in Study Times, the chief newspaper 
of the Communist Party School, reminds the reader that “the CCP got into power because 
its frugal and diligent spirit won the masses,” and warns that “to give that up would mean 
losing power and the mandate to rule” (Huang, 2012). This ties in neatly with Xi’s anti- 
corruption campaign, which instituted austerity measures among cadres and is as much 
a party- building exercise as a propaganda campaign in itself (Yuen, 2014). As such, 
these propaganda pieces often propagate two sets of standards for CCP members and the 
public: diligence, for example, means “diligence in thinking, learning, asking questions 
and doing fieldwork at the local level” for cadres as members of a vanguard party, 
whereas for the public, these values represent desirable forms of behaviour that could 
bring karmic rewards (Han, 2013). On the posters that visually represent these maxims, 
officials are encouraged to be diligent in helping the people and remain incorruptible, 
individuals are encouraged to be diligent in self- betterment and patriotic acts, and, 
together, diligence is described as the only way to achieve the China Dream. Therefore, 
Figure 6. Core Socialist Values (CSVs) Posters with the Slogans (a) “The Frugal are Blessed 
with Happiness and Longevity,” Depicting a Family Taking Leftovers Home after Eating Out at a 
Restaurant and (b) “Happiness is in the Hands of the Diligent,” Depicting a Painting of Harvest.
Source: Wenming (2014).
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individual values such as these are seen to unify the relationship between the cadre and 
the people, and society and the nation.
Individual- level values also attract most supplemental analyses from officials and 
party mouthpieces, as they are seen as instrumental in building the imagined utopia in 
the China Dream narrative. For instance, diligence is praised as the legitimate means of 
upward social mobility, a key characteristic of the middle class and one that the subordi-
nate classes should aspire to follow. Some even went as far as to argue that “the diligence 
of the middle classes should give hope, and act as a good example, for the subordinate 
classes […] to discourage them from having to resort to violence to satisfy their demands” 
(Yang and Wu, 2016). Although it is not in the official stance to pathologise the subordi-
nate classes, such discriminatory language is common in everyday discourse (Miao, 
2016). To position the middle class as moral exemplars for the subordinate class to fol-
low effectively legitimises social stratification, as it downplays the role of institutional 
barriers to upward social mobility and shifts the attention away from the structural to the 
personal, effectively blaming the victim. Similarly, it is posited that personal integrity is 
the moral basis for social stability, the erosion of which is a major problem plaguing 
“transitional society” (Li, 2014). Thus, for these individual virtues, great emphasis is 
again placed on the responsibility of the individual to commit to virtuous behaviours, 
and to obey social rules and laws. The amalgamation of these “traditional” values would, 
according to the overall narrative framework, result in a rejuvenated China where mor-
ally upright, civilised citizens would be in a society shared with a remix of values from 
the Confucian and revolutionary past, guided by a strong party- state. The realisation of 
these values on the personal and societal levels is thus instrumental to achieving the 
state- led national- level goals of prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony. In doing 
so, the CCP effectively socialises the public into playing roles necessary for them to 
build an imagined utopia under the rubric of the “China Dream.”
Conclusion
Propaganda campaigns such as the China Dream and CSVs can be integral to the state’s 
legitimacy- building project. Conceptually, the CSVs discourse constitutes as a “moral 
narrative that expresses a nation’s aspirations and anxieties in poly- vocal conversations 
about the good life, civilisation and progress” (Callahan, 2017; Madsen, 1995). 
Functionally, it is a renewed attempt at public moral education, aimed at encouraging 
self- cultivation and strengthening social stability and national unity. The posters and the 
animated ads examined in this article are ubiquitous in their reach, and together they 
offer insight into how the CCP attempts to employ traditional values in the service of 
contemporary propaganda campaigns. Unlike their state–socialist predecessors, these 
campaigns seek to socialise, rather than mobilise, their audience. This is a layered pro-
cess: first, there is an overwhelming emphasis on so- called traditional Chinese values in 
the CSVs campaigns disseminated at the ground level, despite the fact that they do not 
form a part of the official twelve maxims. Instead of focusing on values with strict state- 
sanctioned definitions such as democracy and justice, the propaganda campaigns on the 
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ground highlight individual virtues such as filial piety, diligence, and patriotism, through 
the romanticisation and homogenisation of the past. The CCP lends legitimacy to these 
concepts not only by labelling them as part of the “thousand- year long Chinese tradi-
tion,” but also by making a careful distinction between how the practice of these tradi-
tions was almost handicapped under imperial China and how the CCP remedied the 
problem by bringing China to modernity in 1949. Thus, so- called tradition and good 
moral values gain a renewed sense of purpose under the CCP’s leadership, as they 
become representative values of the CCP in its role as a ruling party and the ultimate 
authority on public moral education, which in turn legitimises the CCP’s rule. Finally, 
the CCP emphasises modern applications and adaptations for these traditional values, in 
order to appear as the moral authority with a forward- looking image. Two more thematic 
concerns emerge from this narrative. First, these ideas place a significant emphasis on 
the attitude, behaviour, and responsibility of the individual as the main recourse to socio- 
economic and sociopolitical problems, so that it redirects attention away from structural 
and institutional reasons for these issues. Second, through the emphasis on the 
Chineseness of these concepts (both in terms of their traditional origins and the reference 
to socialist legacy), the CCP is able to narratively distance itself from the so- called 
Western universal values and juxtapose the China Dream in opposition to the so- called 
ideology of the West. By positioning itself as the inheritor of China’s cultural heritage 
and reminding the public of its revolutionary successes against imperial and feudal 
oppressors, the CCP thus puts forward the argument that it is the only vessel capable of 
achieving the China Dream.
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